I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment argues that the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)1 may
serve as a jurisdictional basis for claims of international
copyright infringement occurring outside of the United States.2
While the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain3 restricts the class of claims that may invoke ATS
jurisdiction, Sosa does not foreclose such jurisdiction for new
claims based upon customary international law.4 Rather, Sosa
requires that future ATS claims meet definitional “specificity”
requirements, and enjoy international acceptance.5
1

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).

2

See Discussion infra Part III.

3

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).

4

See id., 542 U.S. at 729 (concluding that ATS jurisdiction

remains available to only a “narrow class” of such claims); see
also Anupam Chander, Symposium: On Democratic Ground: New
Perspectives on John Hart Ely: Democracy and Distrust:
Globalization and Distrust, 114 Yale L.J. 1193, 1209 (2005)
(arguing that courts should embrace their post-Sosa function of
promulgating federal common law under the ATS, given the
institutional advantages of the judiciary vis-à-vis the more
political branches of government).
5

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (requiring that claims under the ATS
1

Over the past century, the international community’s
concerted efforts to protect the copyrights of aliens have
resulted in a fixture of normative international law.
Specifically, through the pervasive and long-standing acceptance
of multilateral intellectual property agreements, such as the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (“Berne Convention”)6 and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”),7
principles of transnational copyright protection have risen to
the level of customary international law.8 Because the global
exhibit a specificity-of-definition comparable to three
paradigmatic principles of the law of nations as characterized
by Blackstone, and be “accepted by the civilized world”).
6

Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic

Works, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne].
7

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, (1994),
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
8

Cf. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 162 (2d Cir.

2003) (stating that treaties and other international agreements
may provide the basis for customary international law);
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
2

norm of protecting aliens’ copyrights meets the specificity-ofdefinition and universality-of-acceptance requirements of Sosa,9
claims of international, extraterritorial copyright infringement
may secure jurisdiction under the ATS.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the legal
environment out of which the normative principle of
international copyright protection grew.10 It describes the
history and present-day application of the ATS,11 the major
international agreements that have laid the foundation for the
international norm of international copyright protection,12 the
nature of the problem of international copyright infringement,13
and pertinent post-Sosa ATS litigation.14
Part III of this Comment assesses whether a claim of
States § 102(3) (1987) (stating that customary international law
may be derived from multilateral agreements).
9

See supra note 5 (providing the two requirements that Sosa

imposes for future ATS claims resting upon customary
international law).
10

See Background infra Part II.C.

11

See Background infra Part II.A.

12

See Background infra Part II.B.

13

See Background infra Part II.C.

14

See Background infra Part II.D.
3

international, extraterritorial copyright infringement can
establish ATS jurisdiction in light of Sosa. It concludes that
such a claim passes each of Sosa’s tests, and thus may secure
subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.15
Part IV outlines a study that the United States Copyright
Office should undertake in collaboration with Congress.16 While
performing the study, the Copyright Office should solicit and
consider the views of a wide range of artists17 and organizations
concerned with intellectual property.18 Upon completion of the
study, Congress should determine whether to preserve the ATS as
it currently stands, or amend it to eliminate jurisdiction for
claims of international, extraterritorial copyright
infringement.19

II.

BACKGROUND
The conception of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)20 is

15

See Discussion infra Part III.

16

See Recommendations infra Part IV.

17

See Recommendations infra Part IV.C.

18

See Recommendations infra Part IV.A.

19

See Recommendations infra Part IV.D.

20

See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at

*1, n.1 (D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (deciding to call the statute the
4

traceable to a scuffle between a French diplomat and an
adventurer in Philadelphia in 1784.21 Following the brawl, the
First Congress was concerned that the United States’s inability
to prosecute the aggressors in such incidents would embarrass
the young nation on the world stage.22 Despite its sensational
origins, the ATS was sparsely litigated and nearly forgotten
since its passage as part of the 1789 Judiciary Act.23 More than
Alien Tort Statute, although some courts call it instead the
Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”)).
21

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716-17 (describing Congress’s passage of

the ATS as a response to the so-called “Marbois incident of May
1794” and Congress’s perceived self-incapacity to take effective
countermeasures).
22

See id.; see also Genc Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the

Law of Nations in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act and
International Law, 26 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 193, 225-26
(2005) (describing one version of the ATS’s genesis as based on
the Framers’ and the First Congress’s concerns that the states
might inadequately enforce the law of nations with respect to
affronts on foreign diplomats, and thus cause international
embarrassment for the fledgling country).
23

See Ryan Micallef, Note, Liability Laundering and Denial of

Justice Conflicts Between the Alien Tort Statute and the
5

two centuries later, the ATS remains essentially unchanged,24 and
currently provides jurisdiction for tort claims brought by
aliens that amount to violations of international law.25
Given the adverse impact of international copyright
infringement, in both its creative26 and economic27 dimensions,
Government Contractor Defense, 71 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1375, 1377
(2006) (referring to the ATS as little litigated and nearly
“dormant” for almost 200 years); Carolyn A. D'Amore, Note, Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Statute: How Wide Has the
Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?, 39 Akron L.
Rev. 593, 600 (2006) (noting that the ATS was “essentially
unused” during almost two centuries of existence); Donald
Francis Donovan and Anthea Roberts, Note, The Emerging
Recognition Of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 A.J.I.L. 142,
146 (2006) (describing the ATS as “largely dormant” until 1980,
and only receiving a thorough treatment in the Supreme Court’s
2004 Sosa decision).
24

See Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 372 (7th Cir. 2005)

(observing that the ATS was “[o]n the books since the First
Judiciary Act of 1789” and has remained “essentially unchanged
since then”).
25

28 U.S.C. § 1350.

26

Cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (justifying the protections
6

the ATS has the potential to promote artistic creation and
strengthen the Unites States economy.28 By providing subject
matter jurisdiction for suits against foreign entities that
infringe the copyrights of aliens as well as Americans, the ATS
can indirectly protect the copyrights of Americans.29
of patents and copyrights in terms of their ability “ [t]o
promote the progress of science and useful arts”).
27

See, Frank Ahrens, Hollywood Says Piracy Has Ripple Effect,

Washington Post, Sept. 29, 2006, at D05 (commenting on
Hollywood’s assessment of the evils of movie “piracy,” and
noting that internet-based piracy can be particularly difficult
to combat); Piracy ‘threatens 600,000 jobs’, BBC News, Jan. 20,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/2676117.stm
(warning that international copyright infringement may
jeopardize the jobs of over 600,000 individuals in Europe).
28

See Office of United States Trade Representative, Strategy

Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/June/US
_Exps_Outreach_in_Campaign_to_STOP!_Trade_in_Fakes.html
[hereinafter 2004 Strategy] (stating that global piracy of
copyrighted American goods may weaken America’s technologydriven economy and the competitiveness of American companies).
29

Cf. United States Trade Representative 2006 Special 301 Report
7

Additionally, by permitting suits against foreign entities that
infringe only aliens’ copyrighted works, the ATS can help quash
foreign piracy markets, and thereby secure the copyrights of
Americans.
A.

The Alien Tort Statute: Origins and Interpretation in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain

The ATS was passed by the First Congress in 178930 and has
evolved only slightly over the years.31 The statute reads: “The

(Apr. 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Li
brary/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_up
load_file473_9336.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Report] (identifying
markets for infringing goods as a cause of global piracy, and
recognizing that quashing such markets may reduce global
piracy).
30

See generally Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat.

73, 77 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350) (providing
text of the original act, under which the district courts “...
shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of
all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.".
31

See supra, note 24 (describing how only minimal changes have

been made to the ATS since its passage).
8

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”32 Only one
case33 has been able to successfully establish jurisdiction under
the ATS in the statute’s first 170 years of existence.34
The ATS was revived from dormancy by a wave of human rights
litigation the 1980s, beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,35 a
32

28 U.S.C. § 1350.

33

See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795)

(establishing ATS jurisdiction in a suit concerning the
disposition of slaves aboard a Spanish ship that was captured by
a privateer).
34

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712, 720 (stating that, for more than

170 years after its passage, the ATS furnished jurisdiction only
once).
35

See Terry Collingsworth, Boundaries in the Field of Human

Rights: The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 183, 186 (2002) (describing
the rebirth of the “long-dormant” ATS as commencing with
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, and recognizing the ATS’s subsequent
use as a tool in international human rights litigation); Curtis
A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va. J.
Int'l L. 587, 588-89 (2002) (observing that ATS was inactive
9

case alleging wrongful death in violation of the United Nations
Charter.36 Subsequently, cases alleging false arrest,37 rape,38
murder,39 slavery,40 genocide,41 war crimes,42 crimes against
until Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, after which it served as a
vehicle for international human rights advocacy).
36

See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980)

(listing the bases for the plaintiffs’ claims, which included
U.S. wrongful death statutes, the U.N. Charter, the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against
Torture, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, and other human rights declarations and principles of
normative international law).
37

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692 (denying ATS jurisdiction for a

claim of “‘arbitrary’ detention”).
38

John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 954 (9th Cir. 2002)

(permitting ATS jurisdiction for claims of, among other things,
aiding and abetting rape).
39

See id. (granting ATS jurisdiction for claims of aiding and

abetting murder).
40

See id. at 947 (permitting ATS jurisdiction for claims of

forced labor, which is tantamount to slavery).
41

See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995)

(deeming claims of genocide actionable under the ATS).
10

humanity,43 tortious conversion of property,44 price-fixing,45
environmental contamination,46 and even claims arising out of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,47 have sought to obtain
jurisdiction, at least in part, under the ATS.
The elements of an ATS claim are clear from the statutory

42

See id. (considering claims of war crimes permissible under

the ATS).
43

See id. (allowing ATS jurisdiction for claims of crimes

against humanity).
44

See Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (denying

ATS jurisdiction for a claim of tortious conversion, because it
did not meet the “law of nations” requirement of the ATS).
45

See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627

(D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing a claim of price-fixing under the ATS
as borderline “frivolous” because of its lack of basis in
customary international law).
46

Flores, 343 F.3d at 161 (denying ATS jurisdiction for a claim

of intrastate pollution as insufficiently grounded in customary
international law).
47

In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d

539, 575-76 (D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing most of the plaintiffs’
tort claims on grounds other than the ATS).
11

language:48 the claim must (1) be brought by an alien and (2)
allege a tort that (3) is a violation of the law of nations or a
United States treaty.49 Despite this apparent simplicity,
48

But see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733, n.21 (suggesting that “in an

appropriate case” the Court would consider imposing an
exhaustion of remedies requirement on ATS claims); Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1089-99 (9th Cir. 2006) (considering
and ultimately refusing to graft an exhaustion of remedies
requirement onto the ATS, given that Congress could have easily
created such a requirement when it drafted the ATS’s sister
statute, the Torture Victims Protection Act, in 1991); KeatingTraynor v. Westside Crisis Ctr., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43858, at
*20 (D. Cal. Jun. 16, 2006) (finding an alternative ground for
dismissal of ATS claims on the basis of the tolling of the
statute of limitations); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp.
2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005) (determining that when claims under the
ATS concern “sensitive” matters, such as genocide or torture,
with the potential complicity of a foreign government, a “more
searching merits-based inquiry” may be required); Kadic, 70 F.3d
at 239 (considering and rejecting a mandatory “state action”
requirement for ATS jurisdiction).
49

Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, at *8

(D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2006); Keating-Traynor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12

however, ATS jurisdiction is often complex to assess.50 Most
often, the statute’s third prong proves particularly difficult
to apply.51 As discussed below,52 establishing jurisdiction under
the ATS for claims of extraterritorial copyright infringement
will likewise face the most challenging problems under this
third statutory requirement.
Any case brought under the ATS must pass the two tests of
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: specificity-of-definition and

43858, at *18; Kevin Scott Prussia, Note and Comment, NAFTA &
the Alien Tort Claims Act: Making a Case for Actionable Offenses
Based on Environmental Harms and Injuries to the Public Health,
32 Am. J. L. and Med. 381, 396 (2006).
50

See Jogi, 425 F.3d at 370 (observing at the outset of an ATS

case that there were “a bewildering array of complex issues” to
consider).
51

See, e.g., Bowoto, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, at *7-38

(outlining the three prongs of the ATS, and then proceeding to
consider, and reject the plaintiffs’ claims under, the third
prong).
52

See infra Part III.C Analysis: International, Extraterritorial

Copyright Infringement is a Violation of the Law of Nations and
Satisfies the ATS’s Third Prong.
13

universality-of-acceptance.53 Sosa represents the Supreme Court’s
first-ever thorough examination of the ATS,54 complete with an
extensive historical analysis55 and a forward-looking standard.56
The plaintiff in Sosa, Alvarez, was abducted from his home in
53

See supra note 5 (providing the two key tests of Sosa:

definitional specificity and universal acceptance in the
international community).
54

See Hereros v. Deutsche Afrika-Linien Gmblt & Co., 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 2761, at *31 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2006) (justifying
“keeping [the court’s] hands off” the ATS claim raised in the
case until Sosa was decided, and noting that Sosa “finally did
provide assistance to the federal courts in figuring out what
the ATCA means”); see also Donovan and Roberts, supra note 23
(recognizing Sosa as the first Supreme Court decision to
thoroughly elucidate the ATS).
55

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-24 (discussing the First Congress’s

impetus in enacting the ATS, ATS’s placement in the 1789
Judiciary Act, the question of whether the ATS was effective
upon its enactment or whether it was “stillborn,” and the state
of the “law of nations” in 1789 as informed by Blackstone).
56

See supra note 5 (providing the requirements of definitional

specificity and universal acceptance that future ATS claims must
satisfy).
14

Mexico, allegedly pursuant to U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
orchestration, and brought to the United States for criminal
proceedings in which he was charged with torture and murder.57
Alvarez responded by suing the United States and one of his
Mexican captors (Sosa) under the ATS, alleging that he was
falsely arrested in violation of international law.58
In addressing Alvarez’s ATS claim, the Court faced the
question of whether the ATS was a purely jurisdictional statute,
or whether it was capable of creating new causes of action to
reflect the evolution of customary international law.59 The Court
57

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697-98 (recounting that Alvarez, a

Mexican physician, was charged with prolonging the life of a
Drug Enforcement Agency official who was tortured over a two-day
period and then murdered).
58

See id. 542 U.S. at 698, 734 (stating specifically that

Alvarez argued that his false arrest constituted a violation of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article nine of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
59

See id. 542 U.S. at 712-13 (noting that the petitioner, Sosa,

and the United States were aligned in arguing for a purely
jurisdictional interpretation of the ATS, while the respondent,
Alvarez, sought to characterize the ATS as an invitation to
courts to recognize new causes of action based upon
15

professed to adopt neither extreme approach, and concluded that
the ATS “was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of
addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned
with a certain subject.”60 As a matter of original intent, the
Court determined that the ATS was meant to provide jurisdiction
for three types of claims involving violations of the law of
nations: “offenses against ambassadors, ... violations of safe
conduct[,] ... and individual actions arising out of prize
captures and piracy[.]”61 The common law at the time the ATS was
enacted supplied the cause of action for such claims, and the
international law).
60

Id. 542 U.S. at 714; see also Brinton M. Wilkins, Note,

Splitting the Baby: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Take on
Customary International Law Under the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 2005 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1415, 1415-17 (2005)
(expressing displeasure with the Sosa court’s decision to “split
the proverbial baby[,]” i.e., refrain from adopting a purely
jurisdictional or a purely cause-of-action-producing
interpretation of the ATS, and recommending the former).
61

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; see also William Blackstone, 4

Commentaries *68 (commenting that the three “principal” offences
against the law of nations were violations of safe-conducts,
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy).
16

ATS provided the district courts with jurisdiction to hear
them.62 While the Court held that the drafters of the ATS only
meant to provide jurisdiction for these three types of claims,63
it did not prohibit the ATS from serving as a jurisdictional
basis for new causes of action based upon customary
international law.64 Rather, the Court held that new claims may
62

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; see also David D. Caron and Brad R.

Roth, International Decision: Scope of Alien Tort Statute arbitrary arrest and detention as violations of custom, 98
A.J.I.L. 798, 801 (2004) (mentioning that, when a court, postSosa, creates a new cause of action under the ATS, it does so by
relying upon the federal common law).
63

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (concluding that there is no reason

to believe that the First Congress contemplated any claims
invoking ATS jurisdiction other than Blackstone’s three
archetypical principles of normative international law).
64

See id., 542 U.S. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing

that the First Congress did indeed endorse Blackstone’s three
exemplars of customary international law, but that modern courts
lack authority to fashion new causes of action under the ATS.
Justice Scalia also pointed out that, by relying on the federal
common law to provide the cause of action for new claims under
customary international law, courts may render the ATS
17

secure ATS jurisdiction as long as they “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms” described above.65 The Court’s standard
is quite cautious, but leaves the door open to claims that have
as much “definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations” as the three types of claims originally cognizable
under the ATS.66

superfluous. That is, if federal courts are able to incorporate
customary international law into the federal common law, which
is “supreme federal law,” ordinary federal question jurisdiction
could provide jurisdiction for such claims as well as the ATS).
65

Id., 542 U.S. at 725; see also Igor Fuks, Note, Sosa v.

Alvarez-Machain and the Future of ATCA Litigation: Examining
Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
112, 122 (2006) (recognizing that Sosa’s specificity and
acceptance requirements are “rather vague standards” and may
pose difficulties to lower courts in their application).
66

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-732 (reiterating the specificity and

acceptance requirements of the ATS, and offering the
metaphorical summation that “the door [to the ATS] is still ajar
subject to vigilant doorkeeping”).
18

B.

Post-Sosa ATS Litigation with Relevance to a Claim of
Extraterritorial, International Copyright Infringement

Determining whether a novel ATS claim passes the twin tests
of Sosa requires an assessment of cases that have construed and
applied Sosa. One particularly pertinent case is Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC.67 In Sarei several plaintiffs from Papua New Guinea
brought an ATS action against two corporations for claims of
(among other things) violations of two provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea68 (“UNCLOS”).69 Under the
UNCLOS, states must take measures necessary to “prevent, reduce
and control pollution of the marine environment,”70 including

67

See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Cal. 2002) (providing the

factual background of the case, as written by the district
court).
68

See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833

U.N.T.S. 397 (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (providing the
complete text of the UNCLOS).
69

Id. 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.

70

See UNCLOS, infra note 186, art. 194(1) (incorporating the

definition of “pollution of the marine environment” from Part I,
art. 1(1)(4) of the UNCLOS, to include the introduction of
“substances or energy” into the marine environment, causing
“hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities,
19

land-based pollution.”71 The trial court held, and the Ninth
Circuit agreed,72 that, because the UNCLOS was ratified by 166
nations, it represented the law of nations.73 Consequently, the
plaintiffs’ environmental claims based on the UNCLOS were
permissible under the ATS.74
A second important case that construed Sosa is Jogi v.
Voges.75 In Jogi, much like Sarei, a treaty directed toward state
action (rather than private action) was deemed to satisfy Sosa’s
including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea,
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities[.]”
71

See UNCLOS, supra note 68, art. 207(1).

72

Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078.

73

See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (stating that, while the

United States has not yet ratified the UNCLOS, it has signed it,
and that the UNCLOS’s level of international acceptance
qualifies it a principle of customary international law).
74

See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62 (providing the district

court’s disposition of the case, under which the plaintiffs’ ATS
claim was approved); Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (providing the
Ninth Circuit’s substantial affirmance of the trial court’s
opinion).
75

Jogi, 425 F.3d 367.
20

tests.76 The plaintiff’s claim in Jogi was that he was not told
of his rights, as an arrestee, under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (“Vienna Convention”)77 to contact the Indian
consulate.78 The court held that, while the Vienna Convention
generally deals with inter-state relations, Article 36 provides
detained nationals with a private right to consular assistance.79
The court’s decision relied primarily on certain language of
Article 36 that seemed to imply private rights, and thus a
private cause of action.80
C.

Multilateral Copyright Instruments that Establish
Copyright Infringement as a Violation of the Law of
Nations

The community of nations has sought to reduce copyright
76

See id. at 382 (holding that while “most parts of the Vienna

Convention address only state-to-state matters, Article 36
confers individual rights on detained nationals”).
77

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261

(April 24, 1963) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
78

Id. 425 F.3d at 369-70.

79

Id. 425 F.3d at 382.

80

See id. at 374 (emphasizing that, under Article 36, consular

authorities must receive notification of a detained national’s
detention “if he so requests[,]” and that the arresting state
shall promptly “inform the person concerned” of his rights).
21

infringement through multilateral agreements for over 100
years.81 In addition to the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement,
numerous other multilateral agreements currently address
international copyright law, including the Universal Copyright
Convention,82 the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”) Copyright Treaty,83 the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty,84 the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers
of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their
Phonograms,85 and the International Convention for the Protection
81

See Berne, supra note 6 (providing the text of the Berne

Convention, which was adopted by eight nations on December 5,
1887, and completed in Paris on May 4, 1896).
82

Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731,

revised July 24, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 1341, [hereinafter UCC].
83

World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty,

Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 28542 (adopted by the WIPO
Diplomatic Conference) [hereinafter WCT].
84

World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and

Phonograms Treaty, December 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17,
36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT].
85

The Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of

Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms,
Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
22

of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations.86 Additionally, various recommendations and
declarations of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) manifest an international
consensus on the necessity of protecting the rights of authors
and artists.87

While these multinational instruments signify the

international community’s significant and long-standing
commitment to the principle of international copyright
86

International Convention for the Protection of Performers,

Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26,
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
87

See, e.g., Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artist,

UNESCO, 21st Sess., (Oct. 27, 1980) available at http://portal.u
nesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13138&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201
.html (establishing that, because artists have a “right to enjoy
the fruits of their work[,]” members states have a duty to
protect the works of artists); Charter on the Preservation of
Digital Heritage, UNESCO, 32nd Sess., (Oct. 15, 2003) available
at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17721&URL_DO=DO_TOP
IC&URL_SECTION=2 01.html (calling for a balance struck between
the “legitimate rights of creators” of digital materials and the
general public “in accordance with international norms and
agreements”).
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protection, this Comment relies on the Berne Convention and the
TRIPS Agreement to provide the substantive aspects of that
principle.88
1. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention was adopted on September 9, 1886 in
Berne, Switzerland.89 By the turn of the century, only 12
countries had become signatories to Berne,90 yet today Berne is
in force in 162 nations.91 The Berne Convention, one century
88

Cf. William Party, Choice of Law and International Copyright,

48 Am. J. Comp. L. 383, 419 (2000) (arguing that, if copyright
protection was incorporated into customary international law, it
would most likely occur via the Berne Convention; however, for
purposes of Berne evading its non-self-executory status and
having “direct” applicability in the United States, such an
approach is “too clever”).
89

See Berne, supra note 6.

90

See Contracting Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Show

Results.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=1884&end_year=1900&search_
what=C&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 20, 2006) (providing a
list of the signatory states of Berne in 1900).
91

See Contracting Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowR

esults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=ANY&end_year=ANY&search_wha
t=C&treaty_id=15 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (providing a
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after its origination, finally92 entered into force in the United
States on March 1, 1989.93 In the Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988, Congress declared that the Berne Convention was
non-self-executory, that the United States would perform its
obligations thereunder “only pursuant to appropriate domestic
law[,]” and that the United States’s existing copyright laws
fully satisfied its obligations under the Berne Convention.94
complete list of all current signatory states to Berne).
92

See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National

Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 469, 477
(2000) (suggesting that the United States “belatedly” acceded to
the Berne Convention, and that subsequently, international
pressures have helped to shape American copyright law).
93

See Berne, supra note 6 (referencing the Paris text of the

Berne Convention, which is the most current text of the
Convention).
94

Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-

568, § 2 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); see also 17 U.S.C. § 104(c)
(2006) (denying claims based upon any “work eligible for
protection under” the federal copyright statute arising “by
virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne
Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto”);
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995)
25

Two of the most salient characteristics of the Berne
Convention are its establishment of a “Union” of signatories who
pledge themselves to adhere to certain minimum standards of
copyright protection, and its guarantee of equal national
treatment – i.e., that signatory A will protect the works of
nationals from signatory B to the extent A protects the works of
its own nationals.

95

A third hallmark of the Berne Convention is

perhaps its aversion toward “formalities” that may complicate
obtaining a copyright.96
(observing that, by passing the Berne Convention Implementation
Act and declaring the complete supersession of U.S. copyright
law over Berne’s provisions, Congress “side-stepped” the tricky
issue of protecting moral rights, as required by Berne).
95

See Dinwoodie, supra note 92, at 491 (describing Berne’s

minimum substantive standards and endorsement of the national
treatment principle as the Convention’s overarching
characteristics).
96

See Berne, supra note 6, art. 5(2) (providing that the rights

flowing from Berne “shall not be subject to any formality”);
John R. Kettle III, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer:
Global Harmonization - And the Need for Congress to Get in Step
with a Full Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 12
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1041, 1076-77 (2002)
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2. The TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement is one of several multilateral
agreements97 that were created during the formation of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”).98 Consonant with the WTO’s ambitious
scope, the TRIPS Agreement protects not only copyrights, but
also a broad range of other intellectual property rights.99 The
(describing how the United States had to eliminate its copyright
notice and registration formalities in order to join Berne).
97

See WTO | legal texts - the WTO agreements, http://www.wto.org

/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006)
(providing information about the other agreements in the WTO
bundle, which concern the trade of goods, services, civil
aircrafts, bovine meat, and dairy products, as well as dispute
settlement within the WTO context, trade policy review, and
governmental procurement).
98

See generally The WTO in Brief, http://www.wto.org/english/the

wto_e/what is_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2006) (describing the Uruguay Round negotiations as multilateral
talks aimed at reducing international trade barriers).
99

See WTO | intellectual property - overview of TRIPS Agreement,

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm, (last
visited Oct. 18, 2006) (outlining the various fields of
intellectual property covered by the TRIPS Agreement, which
27

TRIPS Agreement initially had 111 signatories,100 a number that
has since risen to 149.101
Even before the TRIPS Agreement was set to take effect,102
Congress passed legislation implementing the WTO Agreements and
limiting their domestic enforceability.103 Specifically, Congress
include copyright and related rights, trademarks and service
marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents,
and trade secrets and test data).
100

See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 4-18 Nimmer on

Copyright § 18.06 (2003) [hereinafter Nimmer] (noting that the
Final Act of the Uruguay Round Negotiations was signed on April
15, 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco by the United States and 110
other nations).
101

See WTO | Understanding the WTO – members,

http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (providing a complete list of the
WTO’s 149 member nations and their respective dates of
accession).
102

See generally Nimmer, supra note 100, 1.12[D] (observing that

the Senate never actually ratified the Uruguay Round Agreements
as a formal treaty).
103

See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2006) (providing that “[n]o person

other than the United States … shall have any cause of action or
28

declared that federal law would trump any TRIPS provision in the
event of conflict,104 and that the United States – as opposed to
any private plaintiff - would have the exclusive right to bring
a suit under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including
TRIPS.105 Courts have construed these statutory principles as
rendering the TRIPS Agreement non-self-executing, and barring
private claims brought thereunder.106
D.

The Scope and Characteristics of International
Copyright Infringement

Diversification of copyrightable material over the years107

defense under” the Uruguay Round Agreements).
104

See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (declaring the supersession of

U.S. law over any provision of the Uruguay Round Agreements in
the event of conflict).
105

See supra note 103 (providing that private individuals shall

have no cause of action under the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement).
106

See, e.g., In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(regarding TRIPS as non-self-executory in light of Congress’s
requirements that U.S. law trump TRIPS provisions in the event
of conflict, and that only the United States, rather than any
private party, has a right of action under TRIPS).
107

Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (providing that copyrights
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has led to an increase in the means of copyright infringement.108
In 1790, when the First Congress drafted the first copyright
statute for the United States, the only works accorded
protection were maps, charts, and books.109 Modern copyright law
also provides protection for musical works; dramatic works;
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; pantomimes and
choreographic works; motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; sound recordings; and architectural works.110
may apply to “works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression,” including literary works; musical works;
dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works)
with infra note 109 (providing copyright protection for only
maps, charts, and books).
108

Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,

464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984) (describing Congress’ expansion of
federal copyright law as a response to “new technology”).
109

See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Cong. Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124

(granting U.S. citizens and residents copyrights over maps,
charts, and books).
110

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (providing copyright protection for

various types of original works of authorship that have been
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The enforcement of intellectual property rights, including
copyrights, is vital to creativity and economic growth in the
United States.111 According to the Motion Picture Association,
movie companies lose an annual $6.1 billion due to worldwide
copyright infringement, with $1.2 billion coming from the AsiaPacific region.112 The Recording Industry Association of America
estimates that the American music industry loses $4.2 billion
annually to global copyright infringement.113 Similarly, American
publishers of written materials lost approximately $500 million
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
111

See generally 2006 Report, supra note 29 (describing the

harmful effects of global piracy for “creative economies”); 2004
Strategy, supra note 28 (characterizing global piracy as a
threat to “America’s innovation economy”).
112

See Motion Picture Association, Anti-Piracy Fact Sheet: Asia-

Pacific Region (2006) (providing an overview of motion picture
piracy in the Asia-Pacific region, and summarizing the economic
impact it has on member organizations).
113

See Recording Industry Association of America: Anti-Piracy,

http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited Dec.
15, 2006) (comparing copyright infringement to traditional,
ocean-based piracy, and summarizing its effects on the recording
industry).
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from world copyright infringement last year, according to the
Association of American Publishers.114
In terms of the U.S. economy as a whole, “copyright
industries” contributed between $626.2 billion and $1.254
trillion to the national economy in 2002, depending on how such
industries are defined.115 As a percentage of gross domestic
product, that translates into six to twelve percent of the total
U.S. economy for the same year.116 The copyright industry employs
between 5.48 and 11.5 million people in the United States, and
has experienced employment growth rates above those pertaining
to the total U.S. workforce.117 To the extent copyright
114

See Association of American Publishers: Anti-Piracy Program,

http://www.publishers.org/antipiracy/index.cfm (last visited
Dec. 15, 2006) (describing infringement of copyrights for books
and journals as “rampant” and estimating the effect it has on
American publishers).
115

See Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S.

Economy: The 2004 Report (2004) (assessing the economic
footprint of copyright related commerce in the United States in
terms of “core” copyright industries and “total” copyright
industries).
116

Id.

117

Id.
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protection is designed to encourage the production of creative
works by an economic incentive,118 therefore, reducing that
incentive may limit the creative and economic potential of
America.

III. ANALYSIS
The ATS may provide subject matter jurisdiction for claims
of international, extraterritorial copyright infringement. In
any ATS claim, the plaintiff must be an alien who alleges a tort
that amounts to a violation of a United States treaty or the law
of nations.119 According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa,
118

See Furine Blaise, Comment, Game Over: Issues Arising When

Copyrighted Work is Licensed to Video Game Manufacturers, 15
Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 517, 523-24 (2005) (noting that, “from
the beginning,” copyright law was meant to promote creative
production through an economic inventive). But see Russell J.
Anderson, Jr., Return of the Guilds: A Reflection on the
Domestic and International Implications of Eldred v. Ashcroft,
12 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 49, 49-50 (2003) (suggesting that
the focus of copyright policy has changed from the encouragement
of creative endeavors, to enriching the distributors of
copyrighted goods).
119

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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ATS claims must also be specifically defined and enjoy
international acceptance.120 A claim of international,
extraterritorial copyright infringement may satisfy the
standards of the ATS, as interpreted in Sosa, and therefore
successfully secure ATS jurisdiction.
A.

The ATS’s Requirement that the Plaintiff be an Alien
May be Met

The first element of the ATS requires that an “alien” be
the individual or entity bringing the suit.121 In the context of
copyright infringement, this means that the copyright-holder
claiming infringement must be an alien.122 Not surprisingly, this
rather straightforward element has been a minor obstacle in ATS
litigation compared to the second, and especially the third,
elements of the ATS.123 Essentially, an “alien” is a non-

120

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.

121

See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing subject matter jurisdiction

for “any civil action by an alien”) (emphasis added).
122

See Keating-Traynor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43858, at *18

(dismissing plaintiffs’ ATS claims because they were not
aliens).
123

See, e.g., id.

at *18-19 (assessing plaintiffs’ status as

“aliens” in conclusory fashion); Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp.
2d at 24 (noting that the plaintiffs were “plainly aliens,” and
34

citizen.124 A plaintiff with dual-citizenship (in the United
States and another country) is a United States citizen, and thus
not an alien.125 The ATS does not require that defendants be
aliens in order for jurisdiction to vest.126
then progressing to consider “whether plaintiffs have adequately
pled that defendants violated the law of nations”); Arndt v. UBS
AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D.N.Y. 2004) (deciding that,
because the plaintiffs were German citizens, they were aliens
within the meaning of the ATS).
124

Keating-Traynor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43858, at *18. See

also Blacks Law Dictionary 79 (deluxe 8th ed. 2004) (defining an
“alien” as a person born outside of U.S. jurisdiction, who is
“subject to some foreign government, and who has not been
naturalized under U.S. law”); William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries
*354 (distinguishing between natural-born subjects and aliens on
the ground that natural-born subjects are “born within the
dominions of the crown of England,” while aliens “are born out
of it”).
125

See Keating-Traynor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43858, at *18

(barring the ATS claims of two plaintiffs on the ground that
their dual citizenship – in the United States and another
country – rendered them non-aliens).
126

See Miner v. Begum, 8 F. Supp. 2d 643, 644 (D. Tex. 1998)
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Various factual scenarios could give rise to an ATS claim
of international, extraterritorial copyright infringement.
Importantly, however, the ATS could not provide jurisdiction for
claims of infringement occurring in the United States. Aliens
are already entitled to copyright protection under federal
law,127 and therefore resort to the ATS as an enforcement vehicle
would be unnecessary as well as improper.128 Use of the ATS is
(stating that, for ATS purposes, the citizenship of defendants
is “irrelevant”). Other issues may arise that could undermine
the plaintiff’s ability to advance a successful ATS claim
against a defendant, however, such as sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that sovereign immunity did not attach to an individual
member of a governing committee); Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *109-10 (D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)
(recognizing that the United States may claim sovereign immunity
as a defense to an ATS claim if it has not already waived such
privilege).
127

See 17 U.S.C. § 104(a), (b) (providing protection for

unpublished works “without regard to the nationality or domicile
of the author[,]” and for published works of alien authorship in
certain circumstances).
128

Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (inviting Congress to “occupy the
36

desirable, however, where federal copyright law leaves off:
extraterritorial infringement. United States copyright law does
not have “extraterritorial operation.”129 In other words, acts of
infringement that occur outside the jurisdiction of the United
field” of customary international law that otherwise might
provide the basis for an ATS claim); The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that customary international law
is “part of our law” where there is “no controlling executive or
legislative act or juricial [sic] decision”); Enahoro, 408 F.3d
at 884-85 (barring a plaintiff from asserting a claim under
customary international law where a federal statute occupies the
field).
129

Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004);

Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088,
1095-06 (9th Cir. 1994); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Pub., Ltd.,
843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988); Nimmer, supra note 100, 17.02;
see also Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Intellectual Property Law: Principal Paper: Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 Va. J.
Int'l L. 505, 507-08 (1997) (describing the uncertain rationale
behind treating federal trademark law as having extraterritorial
application, but denying such extraterritoriality to federal
copyright and patent law).
37

States are not remediable in federal courts.
Thus the ATS, rather than federal copyright law, may
provide a cause of action where an alien’s copyrights are
infringed overseas. For example, if a British record company
held copyrights to music that was infringed via a Chinese
website,130 the record company may bring an ATS action against
the website. Because the infringing conduct would have occurred
outside the United States, the ATS may prove an attractive
enforcement tool in light of the ineffectiveness of federal
law.131 As another example, if a manufacturing plant in Russia
pirated optical discs,132 an alien with copyrights to material on
such discs may bring an ATS action against the plant. Again,
federal law would not help such a plaintiff because of the
130

Cf. China targets net pirates, BBC News, Apr. 2, 2000,

http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/698659.stm (describing
a Chinese court’s decision to hold a website that offered
pirated music for download liable for damages to Chinese and
American record companies).
131

See supra note 129 (noting that federal copyright law is

territorial in its application).
132

See 2006 Report, supra note 29 (reviewing Russia’s progress

in enforcing intellectual property rights, yet noting that
plants are still used to pirate copyrighted works).
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extraterritoriality of the infringement,133 and the ATS would
represent a promising alternative.
It may be argued, however, that any international norm of
copyright protection must itself be strictly territorial in
nature, and thus could not provide the basis for an ATS action
in a U.S. court. That is, copyright protections under the Berne
Convention134 and TRIPS Agreement135 apply only territorially, and
133

See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.,

24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (determining that, whereas
purely extraterritorial acts of copyright infringement are not
actionable under U.S. copyright law, such acts are not made
actionable in the event they receive domestic authorization).
134

See Kathleen Patchel, Choice of Law and Software Licenses: A

Framework for Discussion, 26 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 117, 148
(2000) (noting that Berne’s protection of intellectual property
rights, as reflected in the principle of “national treatment,”
is territorially limited); Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and
Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright
Infringement Litigation, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 25
(describing the Berne Convention as resting on assumptions of
territorial limitation).
135

See Matthew Kramer, Comment, The Bolar Amendment Abroad:

Preserving the Integrity of American Patents Overseas After the
39

therefore any principle of customary international law derived
from those treaties must also be territorial in application.
However, even if the normative principle of copyright protection
to be drawn from Berne and TRIPS is strictly territorial, an
alien may still use the ATS to enforce that norm in U.S. court.
The reason why is the recognized extraterritorial operability of
the ATS.136 Because the ATS concerns only the tort claims of
aliens, the alleged tortious conduct often occurs outside of the
United States.137 Indeed, (sea-based) piracy, a quintessential
ATS claim according to the Sosa court, occurs on the open seas
rather than on U.S. territory.138 Thus, if the principle of
South African Medicines Act, 18 Dick. J. Int'l L. 553, 572
(2000) (describing the TRIPS framework as “hyper-territorial” in
character).
136

See Donovan and Roberts, supra note 23, 146 (recognizing that

the ATS is an extraterritorial statute, and permits so-called
“universal jurisdiction”).
137

See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.

2003) (concerning an ATS action brought by citizens of Papua New
Guinea who alleged various violations of international law
occurring in Papua New Guinea).
138

See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820) (defining

piracy as robbery “upon the sea”).
40

customary international law derived from Berne and TRIPS is
territorial, countries with extraterritorial statutes similar to
the ATS may be able to serve as a forum for litigation. As it
turns out, the ATS is unique to the United States,139 and
therefore claims of international, extraterritorial copyright
infringement may be brought in U.S. courts and perhaps no where
else.
B.

International, Extraterritorial Copyright Infringement
is a Tort and Satisfies the ATS’s Second Prong

To assess whether extraterritorial copyright infringement
is a tort and thus satisfies the second element of the ATS, the
applicable substantive law in ATS litigation must be
determined.140 That is, does the law of the jurisdiction in which
the infringement took place govern,141 or does federal statutory

139

See Donovan and Roberts, supra note 23, 149 (remarking that

no nation has an extraterritorial statute similar to the ATS).
140

See generally, Party, supra note 88, at 417 (observing that,

because customary international law is universally adhered to,
and exists apart from domestic law, there are no conflicts of
law issues in terms of its substance).
141

Cf. Paul E. Geller, International Copyright: An Introduction,

in 1 International Copyright Law and Practice, § 3[1][a][i]
(Geller ed., 2006) [hereinafter International Copyright Law and
41

law, federal common law,142 state statutory law, or state common
law apply?143 Or, alternatively, does the law of nations itself
provide the cause of action?
The Supreme Court addressed this question in Sosa. It held
that the ATS was originally meant to provide the district courts
with subject matter jurisdiction, while the common law would
provide the cause of action for tort claims.144 Specifically, the
Practice] (deducing that, pursuant to the principle of “national
treatment” under Berne, courts will apply the copyright law of
the nation in which the infringement occurred (implicitly
assuming the suit was brought in that nation)).
142

See generally Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661-62 (1834)

(determining that there is no common law copyright, and thus the
federal copyright statute must determine issues of copyright
infringement).
143

See generally id. (favoring the federal copyright statute to

a state or federal common law of copyright); Jogi, 425 F.3d at
373 (expressing relief that the plaintiff’s claim arose under a
treaty, rather than customary international law, because the
latter is difficult to characterize as either federal common law
or state common law).
144

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (outlining the original

understanding of the ATS, under which the common law was to
42

federal common law was to supply the substantive legal basis145
for claims under the ATS.146
Following Sosa, courts have often avoided discussing the
application of federal common law, and have summarily treated
causes of action as either torts or non-torts.147 Although one
could argue that, if the law of nations is an integral component

provide the cause of action for ATS claims).
145

See generally International Copyright Law and Practice, supra

note 141, at 3[1][a][i] (expressing the view that, if an alien
brought a claim directly under a treaty, such as the Berne
Convention or the TRIPS Agreement, rather than under customary
international law, the law of the nation in which the
infringement occurred would provide the substantive standard and
not the federal common law.
146

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. See also Sarei, 456 F.3d 1069

(applying the doctrine of vicarious liability in an ATS action
as a matter of federal common law).
147

See, e.g., Abdullahi, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at *19

(classifying without discussion plaintiffs’ claims of injections
of an experimental antibiotic as torts); Arndt, 342 F. Supp. 2d
at 138 (deciding without analysis that “conversion” is a tort
under the ATS).
43

of the federal common law,148 the international community must,
therefore, recognize particular conduct as tortious in order to
satisfy the ATS’s second element,149 courts have simply not
addressed this issue.150 Nevertheless, it appears nearly certain
that courts determine whether particular conduct is tortious by
148

See Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 200 (D. Mass. 2004)

(stating that normative international law is binding in U.S.
courts as a component of the federal common law); Leading Case:
B. Alien Tort Statute, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 446, 453 (2004)
[hereinafter Harvard Leading Case] (regarding Sosa as consistent
with the post-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins view that customary
international law is included in the federal common law).
149

See generally International Copyright Law and Practice, supra

note 141, at 1-FRA § 8[3][a] (describing the infringement of
economic copyrights in France as a tort under the civil law);
International Copyright Law and Practice, supra note 141, at 2NETH § 8[1][c][iii][A] (noting that the plaintiffs advanced tort
claims of contributory infringement under Dutch law against
defendants who sold devices meant to circumvent the protections
on copyrighted software).
150

See infra note 145 (discussing cases in which conduct has

been deemed tortious or non-tortious without to some form of
international consensus on such a classification).
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reference to traditional principles of American tort law, rather
than to some form of international consensus on the issue. After
all, if courts were applying foreign law to assess the tortious
quality of infringing actions, they would likely acknowledge
their doing so.151
In terms of copyright infringement, there is no precedent
under the federal common law or any other body of law holding
that international, extraterritorial copyright infringement is a
tort. This is not surprising because courts have never addressed
this issue. Unless and until an alien plaintiff advances such a
claim, the federal common law will not have a chance to
incorporate or reject it. Nevertheless, international,
extraterritorial copyright infringement should constitute a tort
151

Cf. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (determining

without international reference that the plaintiffs’ claims - of
genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, arbitrary detention,
extrajudicial killing – “plainly” satisfied the ATS’s second
element); Arndt, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (regarding the
plaintiff’s claims, including “conversion,” as torts, without
any reference to non-American law); Trans-Continental Inv. Corp.
S. A. v. Bank of Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 565, 570 (D. Cal.
1980) (conceding that “fraud is a universally recognized tort”
without reference to international standards).
45

under the federal common law.
First, under state common law, copyright infringement has
traditionally been deemed a tort.152 Although the law of state
common law copyrights has been preempted in part by the
Copyright Act of 1976,153 it remains partially applicable today154
152

De Gette v. Mine Co. Restaurant, Inc., 751 F.2d 1143, 1145

(10th Cir. 1985); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 186 (2d
Cir. 1981); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine
Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1976); Fenton McHugh
Productions, Inc. v. WGN Continental Productions Co., 105 Ill.
App. 3d 481 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142,
143 (D.N.Y. 1918).
153

See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (providing that federal copyright

preemption occurs with respect to state rights that are (1)
equivalent to federal rights granted under 17 U.S.C. § 106, and
(2) that overlap with copyrightable subject matter as provided
by 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, so long as the work at issue is “fixed
in a tangible medium of expression”); see also Nimmer, supra
note 100, 1.01[B] (restating the two requirements for federal
preemption, and suggesting that Congress fell short of its goal
of eliminating any “vague borderline areas between State and
Federal” copyright provisions).
154

Cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 4 N.Y.3d
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and provides a doctrinal basis from which the federal common law
may draw in characterizing extraterritorial infringement.
Moreover, copyright infringement is considered a tort under the
modern federal copyright statute.155 Thus, if particular
infringing actions constitute a tort under state common law and
federal statutory law, it would seem incongruous for the federal
common law to treat them otherwise. That is, if the only
difference between a claim of extraterritorial infringement and
a claim of infringement occurring in the United States is
territoriality, it would seem illogical to classify the same

540, 559-60 (2005) (holding that sound recordings fixed before
February 15, 1972, are entitled to copyright protection under
New York’s common law until 15, 2067, the date of federal
statutory preemption).
155

Salton, Inc. v. Philips Domestic Appliances & Pers. Care

B.V., 391 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2004), citing Bassett v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 360 (2d Cir. 2000);
Costello Pub. Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see also Nimmer, supra note 100, 14.04[E][2][d]
(characterizing the owner of two television stations that
committed copyright infringement by airing a television program
as a joint tortfeasor with respect to each station).
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underlying infringing actions differently.156
It may be argued, however, that the federal common law
cannot be the doctrinal basis for a claim of international,
extraterritorial copyright infringement, because copyright
protection is grounded in statute rather than the common law.157
If a common law of copyright were recognized, therefore, the
1976 Copyright Act would be effectively evaded.158 The problem
with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between
156

Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing United States v. Smith,

where the court approved of Congress borrowing the definition of
piracy from the law of nations, as a case that contained a
sufficiently well-defined claim of customary international law).
157

See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661-62 (1834) (finding

that there was no basis in the federal, or Pennsylvania, common
law, for copyright protection of published works); see also,
Intellectual Property Stories 66 [hereinafter IP Stories] (Jane
C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (noting that,
under Wheaton, copyright protection is purely statutory after an
author has first published his works).
158

Cf. Nimmer, supra note 100, 1.01[A] (noting that, between

Wheaton in 1834 and passage of the Copyright Act in 1976, state
common law governed copyrights of unpublished works, and federal
statutory law governed copyright of published works).
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causes of action that arise within the domestic common law, and
causes of action that arise as customary international law and
are imported into domestic common law.159 Surely, the Copyright
Act has displaced most of the state common law of copyright,
however, the same cannot be said for the international norm of
copyright protection. First, such a norm would be federal rather
than state in nature, and thus would not face the same
preemption problems faced by state common law under the 1976
Copyright Act.160 Second, federal copyright law is strictly
territorial, and thus does not apply to acts of infringement
occurring outside of the United States.161 Therefore, because the
rights protected by federal copyright law are not equivalent to
159

Cf. Sosa, 542. U.S. at 732 (describing the standard by which

novel claims of customary international law may be evaluated in
order to become part of the federal common law).
160

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring)

(recognizing that “a judicially created federal rule based on
international norms would be supreme federal law,” and could
trump inconsistent state law); see also U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl.
2 (providing that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land).
161

See supra note 129 (describing the strictly territorial

nature of the Copyright Act).
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those protected by normative international law, the latter may
escape federal preemption.162 Third, to the extent the above
argument focuses directly on the federal common law, and posits
that Wheaton v. Peters expressly denied a federal common law of
copyright, it rests on a weak foundation. The Wheaton court not
only declined to apply a federal common law of copyright; it
denied the existence of the federal common law.163 Thus, given
that ATS claims that invoke the law of nations necessarily rest
upon the federal common law,164 Wheaton cannot convincingly
foreclose a federal common law of copyright.165 Not surprisingly,
Wheaton’s wholesale denial of the federal common law did not go
further to suggest that, if there were a federal common law,
162

Cf. Nimmer, supra note 100, 1.01[B][1] (noting that copyright

laws are not preempted by the Copyright Act if they require
“qualitatively” different elements to state a cause of action).
163

See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658 (finding it “clear” that there is

no federal common law, and that the only sources of federal law
are the Constitution and federal statutes).
164

See supra note 144 (providing that the federal common is to

supply the substantive legal basis of ATS actions).
165

See IP Stories, supra note 157, 67 (noting that Justice

McLean, writing for the majority in Wheaton, provided an
assessment of federal common law that “is, at best, suspect”).
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copyright protections would not be a part of it. Finally, as the
law of (sea-based) piracy demonstrates, the federal common law
and a federal statute may coexist even if they prohibit
identical conduct.166 In the case of international norms of
copyright protection, therefore, the fact that U.S. law also
protects copyrights should not bar the federal common law from
incorporating similar protections.
C.

International, Extraterritorial Copyright Infringement
is a Violation of The Law of Nations and Satisfies the
ATS’s Third Prong

Customary international law protects the copyrights of
aliens against extraterritorial infringement.167 Specifically,
166

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (outlawing “the crime of

piracy as defined by the law of nations”) with Sosa, 542 U.S. at
724 (recognizing piracy, under the law of nations, as a valid
component of the federal common law for purposes of bringing an
ATS action).
167

See International Copyright Law and Practice, supra note 141,

at § [2][a] (providing the basis for a different approach toward
an infringement action under the ATS. In a country in which
treaties are self-executing, such as Germany, copyright
infringement occurring in Germany could be considered to violate
the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement. If so, the plaintiff
could possibly bring an ATS action in the United States and
51

through widespread adherence to multilateral treaties such as
the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, the community of
nations has recognized168 and enforced169 a custom170 that protects
the copyrights of aliens.
In order for a legal principle to become customary
international law, three elements must generally be established:
the principle must (1) be of mutual, rather than several,
concern to the community of nations, and (2) be universally
abided by (3) out of a sense of legal obligation.171
bypass the difficulties of articulating normative international
law by asserting a treaty violation instead); see also Jogi, 425
F.3d at 373 (observing that, because the plaintiff’s claim arose
under the Vienna Convention rather than customary international
law, a “knotty question” was be avoided).
168

See infra section II(C)(2).

169

See infra section II(C)(3).

170

Cf. J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of

Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of
the WTO Agreement, 29 Int'l Law. 345, 347 (1995) (describing the
TRIPS Agreement as reflecting “time-tested, basic norms of
international intellectual property law” as found in the Berne
Convention and other multilateral agreements) (emphasis added).
171

Flores, 414 F.3d at 248-49; Abdullahi, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Additionally, as noted above, Sosa requires any claim of
customary international law under the ATS to have sufficient
international acceptance and specificity.

172

Thus, if the

general standard for customary international law is combined
with Sosa’s requirements, the result is four-part test.
Ultimately, ATS claims relying on the law of nations must: (1)
be of mutual international concern, (2) be universally abided by
(3) out of a sense of legal obligation, and (4) contain the
level of specificity required by Sosa. These four requirements
are addressed below.
1.

Multilateral Copyright Instruments Satisfy the
Requirement of Mutual International Concern

International copyright infringement is undoubtedly an
issue of mutual, rather than several, concern to the community
of nations. The very existence of a “Union for the protection of
the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works[,]”173
as constituted by the Berne Convention’s 162 member nations,

16126, at *27-28; see also infra note 8 (describing the way in
which the practice of states may evolve into normative
international law).
172

See supra note 5 (providing the definitional specificity and

universal acceptance requirements of Sosa).
173

See Berne, supra note 6, art. 1.
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establishes that international copyright infringement is an
issue of mutual international concern.174 Similarly, the traderelated overtones of the 149-member TRIPS Agreement,175 as well
as the Agreement’s protection of intellectual property, indicate
the importance of international copyright protection as a matter
of global policy.176 Indeed, more theoretically, to the extent
promoting “dialogue between civilizations, cultures and peoples”
is an objective of the community of nations,177 copyright
174

Cf. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (holding that the UNCLOS codifies

customary international law because has been ratified by at
least 149 nations).
175

See TRIPS, supra note 7, preamble (declaring that a purpose

of the TRIPS Agreement is to “reduce distortions and impediments
to international trade, ... promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, and ... ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights
do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade”).
176

See generally WTO | Understanding the WTO – Intellectual

property: protection and enforcement, http://www.wto.int/english
/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2007)
(linking the international protection of intellectual property
to increased technology transfer and societal improvement).
177

See UNESCO Culture Sector, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/e
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protection on an international basis serves an important
facilitating function toward that end.178
2.

The Universal Acceptance Requirement May be
Satisfied Due to the Widespread Ratification
of Berne and TRIPS

Any normative principle of international law premised on
the international community’s acceptance of the Berne Convention
and the TRIPS Agreement should have no difficulty meeting the
“universal acceptance” requirement.179 Presently, 162 nations are
signatories to the Berne Convention,180 and 149 have accepted the
TRIPS Agreement by virtue of their membership in the WTO.181
Commentators have observed that all of the world’s “important”
n/ev.php-URL_ID=2309&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last
visited Oct. 18, 2006) (declaring quixotically that “[t]he
pursuit of dialogue between civilizations, cultures and peoples
is crucial for the future of humanity”).
178

Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that

the purpose of copyright law is to encourage the sharing and
dissemination of ideas through a scheme of economic incentives).
179

Cf. Nimmer, supra note 100, 17.01 (observing that

multilateral copyright treaties, like the Berne Convention, have
internationalized the practice of copyright law).
180

See Berne, supra note 6.

181

See TRIPS, supra note 7.
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countries adhere to the multilateral treaty framework for
copyright protection.182 In fact, with the exception of Russia,183
each member of the United Nations Security Council is a member
of both Berne and TRIPS.184 These two multilateral conventions
provide a very strong basis upon which to assert components of
normative international law.
Recently, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, several plaintiffs
sued a mining company under the ATS for various human rights
violations, as well as environmental contamination.185 The Ninth
182

See Nimmer, supra note 100, 17.01[B][1][a] (commenting that,

since the United States in 1989, China in 1992, and Russia in
1995 became parties to the Berne Convention, “all the world's
important countries now belong to Berne”).
183

See Gref reckons on completing Russian-American talks on

Russia’s WTO accession by end of October, 2006, http://www.wto.r
u/en/news.asp?msg_id=17999 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006)
(providing information regarding Russia’s attempts to join the
WTO).
184

See Membership of the Security Council, http://www.un.org/sc/

members.asp (last visited Jan. 9. 2007) (providing a list of all
ten members of the U.N. Security Council).
185

See Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1073-75 (noting that the plaintiffs’

claims covered charged of racial discrimination, environmental
56

Circuit approved the plaintiffs’ environmental claim, which
arose under customary international law as reflected by the
UNCLOS.186 The claim was adequate, according to the court,
because the UNCLOS was ratified by at least 149 nations, which
was “sufficient for it to codify customary international law
that can provide the basis of an [ATS] claim.”187 Both Berne and
TRIPS have comparable numbers of adhering states,188 and thus
should easily meet the requirement of universal acceptance.
3.

Customary International Law is Binding on
Signatories and thus Satisfies the Sense
of Legal Obligation Requirement

The Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement impose legal

damages, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).
186

Id. at 1078. See also United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1245 (providing the full text
of the UNCLOS).
187

Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078; see also supra note 8 (providing

that multilateral agreements may constitute customary
international law if they are intended for widespread acceptance
and are in fact widely accepted).
188

See Berne, supra note 6 (providing the official text of the

162-member Berne Convention); TRIPS, supra note 7 (providing the
official text of the 149-member TRIPS Agreement).
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obligations on their signatory nations.189 However, because
neither the Berne Convention190 nor the TRIPS Agreement191 is
self-executing in the United States, neither is directly binding
in American courts.192 Thus, a plaintiff may not advance an ATS
claim of copyright infringement by citing directly to the
language of either agreement.193 Instead, the plaintiff must
189

See generally Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations

Law of the United States § 321 (stating that all multilateral
agreements are “binding upon the parties to” them).
190

See supra note 94 (describing the implementing legislation

that stripped the Berne Convention of self-executive operation
in the United States).
191

See supra note 103 (outlining the implementing legislation

that precluded self-execution for the TRIPS Agreement in the
United States).
192

See Jogi, 425 F.3d at 373 (noting that, if Vienna Convention

were non-self-executing, the plaintiff’s claim based directly on
that treaty would fail); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 111(3) (noting that U.S.
courts are not bound by “non-self-executing” multilateral
agreements unless such agreements have been legislatively
implemented).
193

See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing subject matter
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argue that Berne, TRIPS, and other international copyright
agreements represent a codification of customary international
law, under which international copyright infringement is
prohibited.194
Thus, to satisfy the legal obligation requirement of
customary international law, the plaintiff must argue that the
international norm prohibiting copyright infringement is
internationally binding.195 There is an obvious circularity
problem, however, in demonstrating that a new principle of
customary international law is binding.196 That is, how could one
jurisdiction for aliens’ tort claims that amount to violations
of U.S. treaties).
194

Cf. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (holding that the plaintiffs’

UNCLOS claim may obtain ATS jurisdiction as a matter of
customary international law, without discussing whether the
UNCLOS is a self-executing treaty).
195

See supra note 155 (providing the standard for claims of

customary international law, which includes the legal obligation
requirement).
196

See Joshua Ratner, Back To The Future: Why a Return to the

Approach of the Filartiga Court is Essential to Preserve the
Legitimacy and Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 Colum.
J.L. & Soc. Probs. 83, 104 (2002) (noting that norms are only
59

say that a principle is binding if no one has ever tried to
enforce it? Therefore, it is no wonder that the Sosa court, when
providing the standards for new ATS claims, did not impose a
requirement that such claims be demonstrably binding.197
Essentially, determining whether a claim of international,
extraterritorial copyright infringement qualifies as a principle
of customary international law will first require the issue to
be resolved in court. Thus, Sosa is best read as imposing only
specificity-of-definition and universality-of-acceptance
standards, rather than an additional “legally binding”
requirement.
4. Sosa’s Specificity Requirement May be
Satisfied in Light of Post-Sosa Litigation
In contrast to the previous three requirements, the
specificity requirement, as established by Sosa, requires a more
thorough analysis of the proposed characterization of normative
international law. Indeed, this requirement has caused courts to

“obligatory” for states once they have already been established
as jus cogens or customary international law).
197

See supra note 5 (outlining Sosa’s definitional specificity

and universal acceptance requirements for new ATS claims based
upon the law of nations).
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dismiss ATS claims in numerous cases.198 Nevertheless, the global
norm prohibiting the infringement of aliens’ copyrights is
defined with adequate specificity to overcome the definitional
standards imposed by Sosa.199
Sosa demands that any prospective claim of modern customary
international law have as much specificity as the three 18th
century examples to which Blackstone referred.200 The Sosa court
did not, however, offer much guidance as to how a modern
principle of normative international law could compare to

198

See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (holding

that “sexual violence” failed to measure up as sufficiently
specific and accepted to form a principle of normative
international law under the ATS); Abdullahi, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16126, at *37-38 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ ATS claims
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as insufficiently
specific).
199

See generally supra note 5 (describing Sosa’s specificity and

universal adherence requirements for new ATS claims based upon
the law of nations).
200

See supra note 5 (providing the two standards imposed by the

Sosa court for new ATS claims).
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doctrinally dissimilar principles from the 18th century.201
Nevertheless, ATS cases that have arisen after Sosa was decided
provide illumination along the pathway of customary
international law.
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC202 several plaintiffs
successfully brought ATS claims against two corporations
alleging violations of the UNCLOS.203 According to the Ninth
Circuit, the UNCLOS constituted customary international law
because of its widespread international ratification.204 Just
like the UNCLOS, the Berne Convention205 and TRIPS Agreement206
201

See Harvard Leading Case, supra note 148, at 454 (noting that

Sosa’s specificity and acceptance requirements are both vague,
and potentially difficult to apply).
202

See supra note 67 (providing a factual outline of the case).

203

See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62; see also supra note 68

(providing the official text of the UNCLOS).
204

See id. (stating that, while the United States has not yet

ratified the UNCLOS, it has signed it, and that the UNCLOS’s
level of international acceptance qualifies it a principle of
customary international law).
205

See Berne, supra note 6, art. 36 (providing that each

signatory state “undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its
constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the application
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call for adhering states to conform their laws to certain
standards, rather than regulate private conduct.207 Therefore,
upon a quick reading, neither the UNCLOS, Berne, nor TRIPS
seemingly provide any enforceable rights to private parties as a
matter of normative international law.208 Nonetheless, the
UNCLOS’s requirements that adhering states adopt laws
prohibiting environmental contamination209 did indeed form the
of this Convention.” Upon each country’s accession to the
Convention, the country must “be in a position under its
domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this
Convention.”
206

See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 1 (providing that signatory

states “shall give effect to the provisions” of the TRIPS
Agreement in a manner consistent with their domestic law).
207

See supra note 94 (outlining the Berne Convention

Implementation Act, under which no private party shall have a
cause of action); supra note 103 (describing the implementing
legislation of the WTO agreements, including TRIPS, under which
private causes of action are denied).
208

Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (expressing concern about the

“possible collateral consequences” of creating private rights of
action, derived from customary international law).
209

See UNCLOS, supra note 68 (describing the requirements
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basis of a claim of customary international law in Sarei by
private plaintiffs against two private defendants.210 Evidently,
the UNCLOS’s requirements for signatory states reflect an
international condemnation of the underlying conduct that was
prohibited on a domestic basis, and it was that condemnation
that constituted a principle of customary international law.211
In precisely the same manner, Berne and TRIPS, by their
terms, impose requirements on adhering states rather than govern
private conduct.212 Just as the UNCLOS’s implicit condemnation of
environmental contamination was adequate to form a principle of
customary international law upon which private litigants could
rely, so should be the implicit condemnation of copyright
infringement reflected in Berne and TRIPS.213
imposed upon signatory states by the UNCLOS).
210

Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62.

211

Cf. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (noting that the UNCLOS’s

baseline provisions reflect principles of customary
international law).
212

See supra note 190 (referring to the state-oriented, rather

than individual-oriented, character of Berne and TRIPS).
213

Cf. infra note 203 (describing the private rights that are

implicit in the Berne Convention’s provisions); infra note 204
(referring to the “rights of authors” pursuant to the TRIPS
64

In another post-Sosa case, Jogi v. Voges,214 a seemingly
state-oriented (rather than individual-oriented) treaty was
found to provide a private litigant with a cause of action.215
While in prison, the plaintiff was removed from the United
States and sent to India, his homeland.216 The plaintiff asserted
that, because he was not advised of his rights under the Vienna
Convention217 to contact the Indian consulate for assistance, the
law enforcement officers who dealt with him tortiously violated
his rights under international law.218 The court held that, while
the Vienna Convention is mainly an inter-state treaty, Article
36 provides detained nationals with private rights of consular
notification.219 The court’s decision relied principally on

Agreement).
214

Jogi, 425 F.3d 367.

215

See id. 425 F.3d at 382 (holding that while “most parts of

the Vienna Convention address only state-to-state matters,
Article 36 confers individual rights on detained nationals”).
216

Jogi, 425 F.3d at 369-70.

217

See Vienna Convention, supra note 77 (providing the official

text of the treaty).
218

Jogi, 425 F.3d at 369-70.

219

Jogi, 425 F.3d at 382.
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specific language of Article 36 that implied private rights.220
Analogously, Berne and TRIPS both single out private rights
in exactly the same manner as the Vienna Convention. First, it
is worth noting that Berne and TRIPS are treaties relating to
“copyrights,” and as such, inherently deal with private rights
in a way the Vienna Convention does not.221 As for the
substantive provisions of Berne and TRIPS, Article 1 of Berne
states that the group of nations adhering to it form a “Union
for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary
and artistic works.”222 Article 2 provides that copyright
protections granted by signatory states, pursuant to Berne,
“shall operate for the benefit of the author....”223 Under
Article 5, “[a]uthors shall enjoy ... the rights which [other
220

See supra note 80 (describing how, under Article 36 of the

Vienna Convention, consular authorities must receive
notification of a detained national’s detention upon request,
and that the arresting nation shall notify the detained
individual of his rights).
221

See id. (characterizing the Vienna Convention as concerned

with consular relations and functions, the rights of consular
personnel, and communications with host governments).
222

See Berne, supra note 6, art. 1.

223

See Berne, supra note 6, art. 2(6).
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signatory states’] laws do now or may hereafter grant ..., as
well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.”224
There are numerous similar provisions in Berne.225 Likewise,
Article 3 of TRIPS provides that signatory states “shall accord
to the nationals” of other signatory states copyright protection
equal to that granted to its own nationals.226 Under Article 11,
signatory states “shall provide authors ... the right to
authorize or to prohibit the commercial rental ... of originals
or copies of their copyright [sic] works.”227 Article 14 grants
“[p]roducers of phonograms ... the right to authorize or
prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their
phonograms.”228 Additionally, decisions from WTO-administered
dispute settlement Panels have referred to both Berne and TRIPS
224

See Berne, supra note 6, art. 5(1).

225

See, e.g., Berne, supra note 6, art. 6bis(1) (providing that,

in addition to an “author's economic rights,” he “shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work” and protect against
alterations made to it); see also Berne, supra note 6, art. 7(1)
(determining the duration of an author’s copyright protection as
lasting 50 years after his death).
226

See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3(1) (emphasis added).

227

See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 11 (emphasis added).

228

See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 14(2) (emphasis added).
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as treaties that confer private rights.229 Therefore, if a treaty
concerned mostly with state-to-state conduct such as the Vienna
Convention can be construed to generate private rights of action
because of a few select references to the rights of individuals,
the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement, which inherently
concern private rights and refer to such rights repeatedly,
should likewise be read to create private rights of action.

IV.

Recommendations
If indeed a claim of international, extraterritorial

copyright infringement may obtain ATS jurisdiction, determining
the likely consequences becomes important.230 A wide range of
229

See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US

Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (noting that in
dispute settlement proceedings before the WTO, the complaining
party has the burden of supporting its claims of violations of
“the basic rights that have been provided under the copyright
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement,” and under the Berne
Convention as incorporated by TRIPS. The Panel further
recognized that Berne created “exclusive rights” for “[a]uthors
of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works[.]”
230

Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (noting that courts should be

cautious in expanding the substantive content of the federal
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opinion and experience is necessary to properly assess the
impact of such jurisdiction. To perform the assessment, the U.S.
Copyright Office should work closely with Congress to receive
and consider the views of all interested parties.
A. The Intellectual Property Litigation Context
The effects of ATS jurisdiction within the context of
intellectual property litigation should undergo careful
assessment. The views of American artists, businesses,
consumers, state and federal courts, state and federal
legislatures, and executive agencies are all relevant and
potentially meaningful.231 The Copyright Office should have the
common law, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, without
guidance from the legislature).
231

Cf. Eight Charged with Copyright Infringement for

Distributing the Latest Star Wars Movie that was..., http://www.
usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/valenteCharge.htm (last visited
Jan 9, 2007) (detailing a criminal prosecution of eight
individuals who illegally copied a movie, in which the parties
of concern were the production company, websites, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Department of Justice);
Recording Industry Association of America, http://www.riaa.com/i
ssues/piracy/riaa.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (describing
the recording industry’s interest in curbing music “piracy” and
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responsibility of collecting the views of such parties, and
orchestrating a study on the impact of ATS jurisdiction for
international copyright infringement.232 Only with the benefit of
the opinions and recommendations of such parties may the
Copyright Office make thoughtful recommendations about the
future utility of the ATS as a jurisdictional basis for
international copyright litigation.
B. The Economic Context
The Copyright Office should also explore the economic
consequences of ATS jurisdiction for claims of international

outlining steps it has currently undertaken in pursuance
thereof); Motion Picture Association of America, http://www.mpaa
.org/piracy.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (providing detailed
information about global “piracy” of movies).
231

See generally Background, infra Part II.D (describing the

potential adverse economic effects of international copyright
infringement).
232

Cf. U.S. Copyright Office – Reports, http://www.copyright.gov

/reports/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (providing a list of
studies and reports that the Copyright Officer presently
produces, including annual reports, strategic plans, and more
particularized reports).
70

copyright infringement.233 In this connection, the views of the
Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Treasury Department, and various business interest groups are
important. Additionally, several business organizations that
market copyrighted products have compiled substantial economic
data related to the infringement of copyrights, which may prove
probative.234 Among other issues, the Copyright Office should
consider whether the economic benefits of permitting ATS
jurisdiction outweigh the costs such jurisdiction would impose
as a result of higher levels of litigation.
C. The Artistic Community
Thirdly, the Copyright Office should solicit the
perspectives of those in the artistic communities whose work is

233

See Background, infra Part II.D (describing the potential

adverse economic effects of international copyright
infringement).
234

See, e.g., supra note 112 (providing economic data that was

compiled by the Motion Picture Association relating to
infringement of movies overseas); supra note 113 (summarizing
the economic consequences of copyright infringement for the
music recording industry, as supplied by the Recording Industry
of America).
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both protected and advanced by United States copyright law.235
These individuals, and the groups that represent them, could
offer important recommendations about the benefits of permitting
the ATS to serve as a jurisdictional basis for claims of
international copyright infringement. Similarly, international
organizations that perform work in cultural fields may provide
interesting insights about such jurisdiction from their own
unique perspectives.236
D. Collaboration with Congress
Once the Copyright Office completes its collection and
assessment of the information submitted to it by interested
individuals and entities, the Copyright Office should
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Cf. NAEA | About Us, http://www.naea-reston.org/aboutus.html

(last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (describing the history and purpose
of the 59-year old artists’ organization, the National Art
Education Association); WAA home page, http://www.artuk.co.uk/as
soc/waa.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (outlining the mission
of the World Artists Association, a global artists’ union).
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See generally Fact Sheet No.16 (Rev.1), The Committee on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu6/2/fs16.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2007) (describing the
efforts and objectives related to cultural progress from a
subsidiary organization with in the U.N.).
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participate in a policy-making process led by Congress. The
Copyright Office should submit its final assessment to Congress
in an effort to provide needed insight in the event Congress
decides that legislative action is needed.237
Congress may act upon the Copyright Office’s final
assessment in various ways. For instance Congress could amend
the ATS to expressly prohibit its use in international copyright
litigation.238 This would be a very narrowly conceived solution.
By addressing only copyright litigation and nothing else,
Congress may appear too selective in its legislation. Further,
doing so would undermine the jurisprudential goal of ensuring
predictability in the law.239
Another alternative is to amend the ATS to declare that its
reference to the “law of nations” excludes customary
237

See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (stating that Congress’s

views are welcome on the subject of the ATS, particularly
because of the statute’s foreign policy implications).
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Cf. id. (noting that Congress may “occupy the field” of the

ATS, and thereby remove the law of nations as a basis for claims
made thereunder).
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Cf. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 726 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir.

1984) (stating that, at least as a matter of personal tax
liability, Congress favors predictability in the law).
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international law based upon widespread ratification of
multilateral agreements.240 This would have the effect of denying
ATS jurisdiction for international copyright infringement
claims, but would have collateral effects as well. Denying ATS
jurisdiction on the basis of customary international law
premised on multilateral agreements would certainly implicate
other agreements that may otherwise give rise to jurisdiction
under the ATS.241
Alternatively, Congress may decide to strike the ATS from
the United States Code altogether.242 Doing so may not be as
drastic as it sounds, because the federal question jurisdiction
statute already provides jurisdiction for violations of
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See generally Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (holding that

the UNCLOS, a multilateral agreement, represents customary
international law).
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See, e.g., Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (determining that the

UNCLOS, a multilateral agreement, is a source of customary
international law that may provide private litigants the basis
for an ATS action).
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Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (observing that Congress may

“explicitly” remove the law of nations as a basis for ATS
claims).
74

customary international law.243 In fact, the only function of the
ATS is perhaps to make clear federal court jurisdiction over
claims of customary international law.244
Whatever course of action Congress ultimately takes, the
critical prerequisite to any congressional action is a complete
process of information gathering led by the Copyright Office.
The nature of an ATS claim of international, extraterritorial
copyright infringement is quite complex, and the consequences of
permitting such claims is uncertain.245 Only after gathering and
243

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing federal district courts with

jurisdiction over civil claims “under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States; see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745
(Scalia, J., concurring) (warning that the ATS may become
surplusage under the majority’s analysis, because customary
international law may rely on ordinary federal question
jurisdiction if it is integrated into the federal common law).
244

See Jogi, 425 F.3d at 373 (commenting that there is complete

overlap between “treaty” both “law of nations” jurisdiction
under the ATS and the federal question statute, and that the
only point of “law of nations” jurisdiction under the ATS is
possibly to make clear that such jurisdiction actually exists).
245

See supra note 237 (noting that, without guidance from

Congress, expanding the federal common law to include new ATS
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considering a wealth of information from those in the copyright
field, may Congress properly decide among the alternatives
described above.

V.

Conclusion
This Comment assesses the potential for the Alien Tort

Statute (“ATS”) to serve as a jurisdictional basis for claims of
international, extraterritorial copyright infringement. It finds
that the ATS may successfully provide jurisdiction for such
claims, because of the high degree of specificity with which
copyright infringement is defined by multilateral agreements and
the widespread acceptance of such agreements by the
international community. Consequently, claims of international
copyright infringement may pass the two tests established by the
Supreme Court in Sosa, and invoke subject matter jurisdiction in
federal district courts. Given that the ATS may provide
jurisdiction for claims of international, extraterritorial
copyright infringement, the next step is assessing the likely
consequences. A public policy inquiry, spearheaded by the
Copyright Office, must address whether the ATS should serve as a
jurisdictional basis for claims of international,
extraterritorial copyright infringement. The Copyright Office
claims should proceed cautiously).
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should solicit the views of all interested parties, including
those with particularly important perspectives from the legal,
commercial, and artistic fields. Only with the benefit of the
insights from these groups may the Copyright Office thoughtfully
determine whether to maintain the ATS as a source of
jurisdiction for international, extraterritorial copyright
litigation.
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